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SAWYER v. WHITLEY
112 S.Ct. 2514 (1992)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In 1979 Robert Wayne Sawyer and an accomplice, Charles Lane,
murdered Frances Arwood by beating and kicking her, submerging her
in a bathtub, dousing her with scalding water and, finally, setting her on
fire. The murder took place in Sawyer's home while Sawyer's girlfriend
and her two children were there. A Louisiana jury found Sawyer guilty
of first degree murder.
During the sentencing phase of Sawyer's trial, Sawyer's sister
testified that he had suffered a deprived childhood and that he had been
committed to a mental institution while a teenager. The jury, however,
found no statutory mitigating factors while finding three statutory
aggravating factors and sentenced him to death.
On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Sawyer's con-
viction and sentence.1 Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, vacated and remanded to the supreme court of Loui-
siana for consideration of the sentence under Zant v. Stephens.2 The
Louisiana Supreme Court again affirmed Sawyer's sentence and convic-
tion.3 Sawyer's first state habeas petition was denied,4 and his first
federal habeas petition, in which he raised 18 claims, was denied on the
merits.5 The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and affirmed the
federal court's denial of relief.6 Sawyer's second state habeas petition
was denied and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied discretionary
review.
7
In response to Sawyer's second federal habeas petition, the federal
district court denied one claim on the merits and held that the others were
barred as abusive and successive. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
"granted a certificate of probable cause on the issue of whether [he] had
shown that he [was] 'actually innocent of the death penalty' such that a
court could reach the merits of the claims contained in [his] successive
petition." 8
Sawyer argued that he was actually innocent of the death penalty in
that certain evidence had been kept from the jury during his trial. Sawyer
claimed that the police failed to produce a statement of one of the children
who was present during the murder to the effect that Sawyer had tried to
prevent Lane from setting the victim on fire. Sawyer argued that the
police's failure to produce the child's statement violated his due process
rights under Brady v. Maryland.9 Sawyer also claimed ineffective
assistance of counsel in that his trial counsel failed to introduce medical
records from two mental institutions in which Sawyer had stayed while
a teenager. 10
I State v. Sawyer, 422 So.2d 95 (La. 1982).
2 Sawyer v.Louisiana,463 U.S. 1223 (1983) (relying onZant, 462
U.S. 862 (1983)).
3 Sawyer v. State, 442 So.2d 1136 (La. 1983), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
931 (1984).
4 Louisiana ex rel. Sawyer v. Maggio, 479 So.2d 360, reconsidera-
tion denied, 480 So.2d 313 (La. 1985).
5 Sawyer v. Butler, 848 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1988), affd on reh'g en
banc, 881 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1989).
6 Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
7 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1991).
8 Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S.Ct. 2514,2518 (1992).
9 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
10 Sawyer, 112S.Ct. at2518.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision,11 holding
that a court may not reach the merits of successive claims, new claims
which constitute an abuse of the writ, or procedurally defaulted claims,
unless the petitioner first shows cause and prejudice or, if unable to make
such a showing, demonstrates that refusal to hear the claim would result
in a "miscarriage of justice." 12 This last exception is known as the
"actual innocence" exception. 13 The Sawyer Court held that "to show
'actual innocence' [of the death penalty] one must show by clear and
convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable
juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under
the applicable state law."
'14
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Sawyer Court began by explaining that the "prototypical"
example of "actual innocence" is in the case where the wrong person has
been convicted of a crime. At the state level, claims of "actual inno-
cence" in this circumstance would be made, for example, in a motion for
a new trial. The Court noted that standards for granting such motions are
rigorous. 15
At the federal habeas level, to successfully claim "actual inno-
cence" of a non-capital crime a petitioner must show that a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent. 16 When one has been convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death, however, the petitioner may also argue that he is
"innocent of death."'17 The Court noted that it had failed to define
satisfactorily the "innocent of death" exception in prior cases and set its
task in Sawyer as one of "further amplify[ing] the meaning of 'actual
innocence' in the setting of capital punishment."
18
The majority suggested three possible ways to define "actual
innocence" in the capital punishment context. The first and most strict
definition would be "to limit any showing to the elements of the crime
which the State has made a capital offense." 19 The Court rejected this
definition as contrary to Smith v. Murray,20 where the Court had
expanded the definition of "actual innocence" to include "innocent of
death. '21 Limiting the definition to the elements of the offense of capital
murder would be to effectively eradicate an "innocent of death" excep-
11 Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1991).
12 Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2518. The Court based this holding on its
concerns for finality and for the costs involved in federal habeas review.
13 Id.
14 Id. at2517.
15 Id. at 2519.
16 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
17 See, e.g., Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989); Smith v.
Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
1 Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2519.
19 Id. at 2521.
20 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
21 Sawyer, 112 S.Ct. at 2521.
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tion since one would have to be innocent of the capital crime itself.
The second definition that the Court entertained was rejected as too
lenient. Sawyer urged the Court to allow the showing of "actual
innocence" to encompass the elements of the crime, the existence of
aggravating factors, and the mitigating evidence which the sentencer
would use in its decision of whether to impose a life sentence or the death
penalty. Sawyer argued that the test should be whether the sentencer was
given a "factually inaccurate sentencing profile" of the petitioner be-
cause of a constitutional error.
The Court found, however, that Sawyer's suggested definition of
"actual innocence" was too lenient and subjective because it extended to
the existence of mitigating factors.22 The Court argued that if federal
courts are to reach the merits of successive, procedurally defaulted, or
abusive habeas petitions, the petitioner should be required to show more
than that which he was required to show on the first petition. The Court
noted that this would not be the case if "innocence of death" encom-
passed consideration of new mitigating evidence.23
Instead, the Sawyer Court settled on a third alternative it deemed the
"middle ground" and adopted the Court of Appeals' definition of "actual
innocence":
[W]e must require the petitioner to show, based on the evidence
proffered plus all record evidence, a fair probability that a
rational trier of fact would have entertained a reasonable doubt
as to the existence of those facts which are prerequisites under
state or federal law for the imposition of the death penalty.24
Thus, "innocence of death" cannot be shown by simply claiming that
mitigating evidence was prevented from being introduced, but requires
a finding that the petitioner would not have been death eligible at all
under the statute (i.e. aggravating circumstances were missing). The
Sa nyer Court saw this standard as desirable because it provided a
workable, relatively objective test for courts to apply.25
Applying this standard to Sawyer's two claims of error, the Court
found that reasonable jurors could still have found Sawyereligible for the
death penalty. In so doing, the Court reemphasized that it was not enough
that the evidence might present new mitigating evidence, but must cast
doubt on the likelihood that aggravating factors would have been found.
As to the child's statement that was not produced by the police, the
Court agreed that it was exculpatory and went "both to petitioner's guilt
or innocence of the crime... and the aggravating circumstance of a
murder committed in the course of an aggravated arson."'26 The Court
found, however, that in light of all the other evidence before the jury, the
jury could still have found Sawyer death eligible. For example, the Court
noted that because evidence showed that the murder also fell under the
aggravating circumstance of being "cruel, heinous and atrocious," the
jury could have found Sawyer death eligible even without the arson
22 Sawyer, 112 S.Ct. at 2521.
23 Id. at 2522.
24 Id. at 2523 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812,820 (5th Cir.
1991))
25 The Court, in its quest for this objective standard, examined the
broad constitutional requirements of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (requiring that states adopt narrowing factors which limit the class
of death eligible defendants); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
(requiring that the sentencer give individualized consideration of par-
ticular defendants),and decided that the most objective, practical and
expedient focal point of the "innocent of death" question is whether the
defendant was death eligible.




In considering the psychological evidence which Sawyer claimed
was kept from the jury, the Court found that it did not bear on either guilt
or innocence or the aggravating factors that the jury found. Thus, even
if the jury had been given the opportunity to consider Sawyer's psycho-
logical records, the Court found that "it cannot be said that a reasonable
juror would not have found both of the aggravating factors which make
petitioner eligible for the death penalty.
'28
The differences between Louisiana's and Virginia's statutory ag-
gravating factors should be noted for purposes of a Sawyer claim.
Louisiana's aggravating factors are fairly specific and read more like
Virginia's statutory definition of capital murder. 29 Conversely, Virginia's
statutory aggravating factors are extremely vague:
[T]he Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that there is a fair probability based upon the evidence of the
prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances sur-
rounding the commission of the offense of which he is accused
that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his
conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim.
30
Sawyer may be one of the few instances where the breadth of
Virginia's aggravating factors can work to the defense's benefit. Given
that the Virginia Supreme Court has extended great leeway in what can be
used to prove future dangerousness and vileness, similar leeway should
exist as to what can disprove the factors and thus fall within Sawyer's
definition of actual innocence. New evidence of a psychological disorder,
for example, should be presented not as mitigating evidence, but as casting
doubt on whether the jury could have found future dangerousness or
vileness. The disorder, for instance, may suggest that the jury would not
have found that the defendantposed a future dangeriftreated or that his acts
were "vile" or "depraved" given his mental condition.
At bottom, though, the Sawyer standard for showing "actual inno-
cence of death" is extremely difficult to meet. Therefore, defense
counsel should attempt to prevent ever having to make this showing by
avoiding successive, procedurally defaulted or abusive federal habeas
petitions.
One way to avoid the need for these types of petitions is to properly
preserve all issues for appeal. In Virginia, defense counsel must make a
timely objection, 31 assign the ruling as error 32 and argue the issue on
brief 33 in order to preserve issues for appeal. In addition to preserving
issues, defense counsel should "federalize" the issues early in the capital
trial process beginning pre-trial if possible. Federal courts have no
jurisdiction to decide claims that are presented and decided purely on the
29 For example, one of Louisiana's aggravating factors is that "the
victim was a fireman or peace officer engaged in his lawful duties,"
La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. 905.4(b)(West 1984), which in Virginia is a
basis for capital murder: "[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing of a law enforcement officer... when such killing is for the
purpose of interfering with the performance of his official duties." Va.
Code Ann. §18.2-31(6)(1990).
30 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990). Fora discussion of the
Virginia "vileness" factor in light of three recent Supreme Court cases,
see case summary of Stringer v. Black, Sochor v. Florida, and Espinosa
v. Florida, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
31 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25.
32 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:27.
33 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:17.
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basis of state law.
Although the best course is to try to avoid having to make the "actual
innocence of death" showing, some defensive preparation for making the
claim is necessary. Since Sawyer limits the showing of "innocence of
death" to aggravating factors alone, defense counsel should begin
litigation of Virginia's "vileness" and "future dangerousness" aggravat-
ing factors at the pre-trial stage. Defense counsel should file a motion for
a bill of particulars asking the Commonwealth to identify the aggravating
factor(s) upon which it intends to rely in seeking the death penalty and,
generally, to identify all evidence which it intends to produce in support
of the aggravating factors identified. These steps not only preserve issues
for appeal, but also help narrow the issues should the capital defendant
argue "actual innocence of death" at the federal level.
More specifically, defense counsel should state in this motion that
if the Commonwealth intends to prove "vileness," the court should order
the Commonwealth to identify which components of that aggravating
factor - torture, depravity of mind, aggravated battery - it intends to
prove. The motion for a bill of particulars should also request that the
Commonwealth identify any unadjudicated acts which it intends to offer
as evidence of future dangerousness. If the court grants the motion,
defense counsel should also argue that the jury instructions must be
limited to the aggravating factors enumerated in the bill of particulars.
If the trial court orders the Commonwealth to provide a bill of
particulars to the defense, federal courts may be precluded from relying
on other aggravating factors to argue that reasonable jurors could have
found the defendant death eligible. For instance, had the prosecution in
Sawyer's capital trial relied solely on Louisiana's "aggravated arson"
aggravating factor,34 Sawyer's Brady claim might have been sufficient
to establish "actual innocence of death," for without that one aggravating
factor, no reasonable juror could have found Sawyer to be death eligible.
Under those circumstances, the court could not have then found that a
reasonable juror still could have found Sawyer to be death eligible under
Louisiana's "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor.
35
Summary and analysis by:
Wendy Freeman Miles
34 La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.4(c) (West 1984).
35 La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.4(g) (West 1984).
TREVINO v. TEXAS
112 S.Ct. 1547 (1992)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In 1983, Joe Mario Trevino, of Hispanic descent, was charged with
the murder and rape of eighty-year-old Blanche Miller, a capital offense
in the State of Texas. Prior to the jury selection in his trial on February
1, 1984, Trevino's counsel filed a "Motion to Prohibit the State from
Using Peremptory Challenges to Strike Members of a Cognizable
Group." The motion stated: "This common use of the State's peremptory
challenge in a criminal trial deprives the Accused of due process and a
fair trial. This practice deprives the Accused of ajury representing a fair
cross-section of the community in violation of the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution." The trial court did not rule on the motion
until the voir dire. During voir dire, the State used its peremptory
challenges to excuse the only three black members of the panel. After
each of these strikes, defendant's counsel renewed his motion. Each time
the court denied his motion.
Trevino was convicted by an all-white jury, and the court sentenced
Trevino to death. Trevino appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals for
Texas and filed his brief in December, 1985. Renewing his pretrial
motion and objections, Trevino contended that the prosecution's use of
its peremptory challenges was based solely on race and that such a use
violated his "rights to due process of law and to an impartial jury fairly
drawn from a representative cross section of the community," basing his
claim on the provisions of the Texas Constitution and the Sixth and
Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
Five years after Trevino filed his brief in the Court of Criminal
Appeals for Texas, that court affirmed Trevino's conviction and death
sentence.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon Holland v.
Illinois,2 which held that peremptory challenges based upon race are not
prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. The appellate court stated in a
1 Trevino v. State, 815 S.W.2d 592 (1991).
2 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
3 Trevino v. State, 815 S.W. 2d at 598, n.3.
4 Trevino v. Texas, 112 S.Ct. 1547, 1550 (1992).
5 Id.
6 Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a defendant
can make a prima facie case for an equal protection violation by showing
footnote that Trevino's arguments "did not amount to a reliance on the
Equal Protection Clause. ' 3 The United States Supreme Court reversed
and remanded.4
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held that Trevino had adequately
preserved his claim at trial that the prosecution's race-based use of its
peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause. 5 TheCourt
also found that because Trevino's case was presented on direct appeal,
he was entitled to retroactive application of the rule announced inBatson
v. Kentucky.6 The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals for Texas and remanded the case for further proceedings.
7
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Trevino had conceded to the Court of Criminal Appeals for Texas
that under Swain v. Alabama8 there was no equal protection violation for
the race-based use of peremptory challenges in a single case. However,
Trevino noted that the United States Supreme Court was considering the
question under the Sixth Amendment in Batson v. Kentucky.9 Trevino
argued that even if the Batson decision did not relax the requirement of
a pattern of discrimination, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals should
prohibit race-based peremptory challenges as a matter of state law.
The United States Supreme Court held in Batson in April 1986 that
if a defendant could make aprimafacie showing that the prosecution had
used its peremptory challenges to strike members of the defendant's race
from the jury, the prosecution would bear the burden of proving another
justification for the strikes.1 0 The Batson court based its decision not
upon a Sixth Amendment rationale, but upon an equal protection basis.
that the State exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude members of
the defendant's racial group)).
7 Trevino, 112 S.Ct. at 1550.
8 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
9 No. 84-6263, cert. granted, 471 U.S. 1052 (1985).
10 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
